Research
Alexandra Bradner works in the philosophy of science on theories of
explanation, specifically on Bas van Fraassen’s pragmatic theory and Peter
Achinstein’s illocutionary theory. In
the wake of contemporary naturalist responses to Pyrrhonian (Humean and Wittgensteinian)
arguments against a priori criterial philosophy — David Hull’s
populationist approach to scientific method and Arthur Fine’s diagnosis and
resolution of the realism anti-realism debate serve as two important examples —
she is interested in the meta-philosophical issue of theoretical
constraint. Her dissertation argued that
contextual approaches to explanation and understanding remain unconstrained
without theories of explanatory rejection.
This kind of work raises the following question: If argumentation cannot elevate one theory
over another, what can? And this
question has led her to explore the growing field of empirical philosophy, in
which philosophers look to more empirical disciplines to constrain their
theorizing. She is presently
collaborating with Seth Chin-Parker, a Denison cognitive scientist, in a series
of experiments designed to ascertain whether there is empirical support for
theories of explanation like van Fraassen’s and Achinstein’s. If we in fact do turn to familiar (or
“relevant”) styles of explanation as a result of some kind of framing effect,
this natural fact might serve as a reason to opt for contextual or
satisfaction-based theories of explanation over competitors such as the causal
and unification approaches. Alexandra
and Seth have presented their work at both the Society for Philosophy and
Psychology and CogSci2008.
Her other research interest builds on the questions raised by pragmatic
theories of explanation about the relationship between understanding, justification
and truth in the subfield of metaethics. Explanationist arguments for moral realism rely unconsciously upon
causal theories of explanation. But if
these arguments were to recognize the more contextual or satisfaction-based
approaches to explanation, moral realism would become as difficult to defend as
explanationist arguments for scientific realism pace van Fraassen. The fact that a theory helps us to understand
a series of phenomena may not be due to the fact that the theory is true. And a theory’s ability to explain may not
serve as a reasonable mark in favor of either its truth or epistemological
status.
Alexandra’s “Teaching Modernity in Appalachia”
(forthcoming in Teaching Philosophy) takes inspiration from contextual
or satisfaction-based theories of explanation to argue that philosophers should
take into account the culture of the region in which they’re teaching when
designing their courses. Appalachian
religiosity by combined with the post-modern Appalachian sensitivity to labor
and power offer contrastive inroads when teaching modern philosophy. Students’ understanding of modernity is
deepened through the exploration of this contrast class.
